1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China AF15

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

A

Reduce AB to BC

B C

[Face p. 738] (a)

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China AF15

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

Reduce AB to CB

[Face p. 738 (b)]

248 433 According to Communist reports, some of the factors responsible for the rapid increase in cotton acreage and production were the fixing of a favorable parity price between cotton and grain and the improvement of per-unit yield. The increase and decrease in the adjustments of the parity price corresponded to the higher or lower cotton acreage. The prices which were quoted for grains of different regions are shown in the following tabulation.

248 243 435 Table 13 The Ratio of Cotton Price to Price of Grains */

(In weight-units of grain to one unit of cotton lint, 7/8" grade)

Region	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Wheat	7.0	8.0	7.5-8.5	6.25-7.5	6.75-8.00	Same
Millet	8.0	8.5	8.0-9.5	6.75-8.0	7.50-8.25	as
Rice	6.5	8.5	8.0-9.0	6.75-8.0	7.25-8.25	1954

*/ Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, Chang-chiang Jih-pao, [Yangtze Daily Co.], 1950, p. 574; Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly], Shanghai, May 28, 1953, NO. 28, p. 21; NCNA, March 3, 1954.

248 Among the East China provinces,
243 Shantung and parts of Anhwei and Kiangsu belong
435 to the wheat region, while a large part of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang and Fukien belong to the rice region. In 1953 the parity prices were lowered and the acreage and the production also decreased.

248 An upward trend in the average cotton
433 yield per unit of land was ndiced during 1949-53, except for a slight fluctuation in 1953, 11.6 per cent below the figure for 1952. This loss was the result of natural calamities in Shantung and Kiangsu provinces. The cotton yields of different provinces from 1949 to 1953 are shown in Table 14.

731 in East China. The Chinese Communists began to harness the Hwai River in 1950. The essential projects included (1) the building of the San River Regulator, (2) the excavation of new diversion canals, one at Po-kang and two near Wu-ho, and (3) the building of Fo-tzu-ling Reservoir on the P'i River and Mei-shan Reservoir on the Shih River.[33] The above-mentioned water-conservation projects are said to be finished except for Meishan Reservoir, which is to be completed during the first months of 1956,[34]

Other projects included the dredging of the channel of the Hwai River and its 70-odd tributaries as well as many minor projects; all of which were completed during the period 1950-55. An estimated 36.4 million shih-mou (6.06 million acres) of land in northern Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Shantung provinces have benefited from the completion of these projects.[35]

Other flood-prevention projects in East China, including the building of a new 190-kilometer channel of the I (Yi) River, a 14-kilomet canal joining the Shu and Sha rivers, and another canal joining the I (Yi) and Shu rivers were completed before 1952.[36]

243
731 In 1950, a good harvest of maize was gathered on 7,500,000 shih-mou (1,250,000 acres)

33. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 22, June 2, 1955, p.702.
34. People's China, February 1, 1953, pp. 14-15.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., June 16, 1953, p. 18-24.

243 of farmland in the Hwai-yin region southwest of 73/ Lo-ma Lake. In 1951 and 1952, good harvests were reported throughout the basin of the two rivers, and not a single mou of land was flooded. The agricultural production of northern Kiangsu region[37] was 20 per cent higher in 1952 than in 1951.

X. CONCLUSION

423 One of the most striking features of East China's land reform was the promulgation of a series of orders extending favorable treatment to families of overseas Chinese residing in the rural districts of Fukien Province. The Communists hoped to stimulate the investment of remittances from foreign countries in agricultural and industrial enterprises in China. The inequality of treatment for peasants of the same district tends to arouse a great deal of discontent among the peasants in the East China Region, especially those in Fukien Province, who have no relatives overseas.

After land distribution, the basic problem in the Chinese rural communities still remains as before -- too many people and too little land. Mao Tse-tung admitted in July 1955 that the average per capita land-holding is still very small -- only about 3 shih-mou (1/2 acre) per capita for the country as a whole. In some areas of East and Central-South China it is as little as 1 shih-mou (1/6 acre). Mao hopes to organize these scattered small farmers into units for semi-collective farming called agricultural producers'

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
RICE
Each Dot Represents Approximately 10,000 Acres or 60,000 Mow.
The Area Covered by Each Dot Is Roughly Equal to the Actual Area Which It Represents.
Data From Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (Peking) as Mapped by LaFlure, Pearce and Baker.
Revised by George B. Cressey.

May 11. Distribution of Rice Production in China (reproduced here by the courtesy of the McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., from G. B. Cressey, *China's Geographic Foundations* [1934]).

[p. 141]

2: Murphy G-4 (no date) 1953 AF15 East China AF15

for sale in Shanghai is not only convenient but environmentally advantageous.

How much of the city's supply of vegetables comes from its market-garden area (a day's water travel, or about a 30-mile radius from the city, an area where vegetables rival rice as the leading crop), and how much from greater distances is difficult to determine with any accuracy in the absence of published records. The principal vegetable market in Shanghai is along both banks of Soochow Creek near its mouth, which suggests that vegetables come into the city by water from its immediate environs. Merchants and vendors there, including many farmers who bring their vegetables into the city by sampan for daily or twice weekly markets, speak only of the near neighborhood of the city as the source of their wares. About 15 square miles within the Municipality of Greater Shanghai itself are occupied by vegetable crops,[31] which can take the fullest advantage both of convenience to the market and of favorable environment in this fertile flat delta land. Vegetables undoubtedly come into the city in large amounts from greater distances, although it is unlikely that bulk shipments of such perishable commodities would move beyond the delta. The railways do not carry them in any significant quantities.[32]

Although its place in the Shanghai diet is relatively minor (see above p. 139), wheat is a major food commodity for the city because of the prominent place of the flour milling industry there. While over two-thirds of the flour milled is exported, principally to north China ports, the wheat must first be brought to the city even though most of it is not eventually consumed there.

Shanghai drew its domestic wheat largely from Kiangsu. Only a minor crop within the fertile triangle, wheat is of much greater importance in the drier and colder areas of Kiangsu north of the Yangtze, and in the western parts of the delta. This production, plus the wheat raised almost entirely for sale as a dry-field winter crop within the fertile triangle, can be carried to Shanghai from nearly every producing area via the water network of the delta, including the Yangtze itself. While the delta area is by no means a leading wheat producer, it is wholly unique among wheat areas in China in its cheap and easy transport connections with a large urban